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A Question of Power: Judicial Review
of Congressional Rules of Procedure
James I spoke of the mystery of the King's power The institutions of a secular, democratic government do not generally
advertise themselves as mysteries. But they are. What they do,
how they do it, or why it is necessary to do what they do is
not always outwardly apparent. Their actual operation must
be assessed, often in sheer wonder, before they are tinkered
with, lest great expectations be not only defeated, but mocked
by the achievement of their very antithesis.*

INTRODUCTION

To note that the Supreme Court has affirmed the authority
of the judiciary to review, for constitutional compliance, the

acts of the other branches of government is to invoke an axiom
tempered by a long history I Equally axiomatic, however, is the
observation that over 200 years of constitutional debate and
2
scrutiny have failed to define precisely the scope of that review.

The debating halls are filled by those who would find in the
Constitution a reserved and guarded role for the judiciary in
voiding the acts of other branches, 3 as well as those who would

*

Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurrmng)

(quoting A. BicKEL, RErFoRM AND CoN nmrr 2 (1971)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
2 See, e.g., JuxcuL. REviaw iN A3PamicA HISToRY: MAJoR H olcAL INTERPRETATIONS (K. Hall ed. 1987).
See, e.g., J. CsoPER, JuDmcut Rnvmw AND THE NATIONAL PoLTcAL PRocass
123 (1980) ("[The judiciary's] constitutional role is limited to protecting those individual
rights that are unambiguously expressed or that at least may in some persuasive way
fairly be found within the broad philosophical confines of the basic charter."); L. HAND,
THE B&.L oi RiGrrs 15 (1958) ("[S]ince [the power of judicial review] is not a logical
deduction from the structure of the Constitution but only a practical condition upon its
successful operation, it need not be exercised whenever a court sees, or thinks that it
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find for the judiciary a broad mandate in the realm of consti-

tutional interpretation. 4
What continues to be at issue, therefore, is no less than a
determination of the boundaries that mark the federal judicial

power 5-boundaries that cannot, of course, be considered in a
vacuum. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed, "[t]he exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships between

sees, an invasion of the Constitution."); Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court,
37 U. Cm. L. REv 19, 45 (1969) ("Essentially because [the Court's] most important
function is antimajoritanan, it ought not to intervene to frustrate the will of the majority
except where it is essential to its function as guardian of interests that would otherwise
be unrepresented in the government.
"); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv L. REv. 129, 135 (1893) ("In so far
as legislative choice, ranging here unfettered, may select one form of action or another,
the judges must not interfere, since their question is a naked judicial one." (emphasis
in original)); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv L.
Rav 1, 19 (1959) ("A principled [judicial] decision,
is one that rests on reasons
with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their
neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.").
' See, e.g., A. BicKn, Tm LEAST DANGERoUs BRANCH 25 (1962) ("[C]ourts have
certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives
do not possess."); W DOUGLAS, Tim COURT Yn.Axs: 1939-1975 55 (1980).
Those who take the other view of the role of the Court are called the
"activists"; and this was the label that the Harvard cabal used against
Brennan, Black, Warren and myself. My view always has been that anyone
whose life, liberty or property was threatened or impaired by any branch
of government-whether the President or one of his agencies, or Congress,
or the courts (or any counterpart in a state regime)-had a justiciable
controversy and could properly repair to a judical tribunal for vindication
of his rights.
Id., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rv. 703, 705 (19741975) ("It seems to me that courts do appropriately apply values not articulated in the
constitutional text, and appropriately apply them in determimng the constitutionality of
legislation.").
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The boundaries of judicial review, however, necessarily include
the limitations of art. III, § 2 which confine federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and
"controversies." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNra, CONsTr oNAL LAw § 2.12(a)
(1986); see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (quoting Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 117879 (Bork, J., concurring)), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984):
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III-not only standing but
mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like-relate in part, and in
different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an
intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative
judiciary in our kind of government.

1987-88]

REvmw OF CONGRESSIONAL RuLBs

O1

PROCEDURE

599

the co-equal arms of the National Government." ' 6 The result
of our system of separate but equal governmental divisions is
7
inherent tension.
This commentary begins by recognizing that at few intersections is this inherent tension greater than at the point where
the judicial branch is asked to review the rules of procedure
by which the legislative branch conducts its business. 8 Part I
discusses the nature of congressional rules of procedure by
briefly exploring the constitutional and historical framework
upon which these rules are founded. Part II surveys the judicial
decisions written in response to a request to review the rules
of Congress. Finally, Part III suggests that the judicial review
of congressional rules of procedure should be exercised in only
the most limited of circumstances. Indeed, focusing on arguments developed by former District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals Judge Robert Bork, this Comment concludes that
an absence of jurisdictional power demands this result. 9
6 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Umted for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
Madison's commentary of 1788 continues to be relevant:
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has
yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the pnvileges and powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily
occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in
these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.
Tnz FEDER.AnsT No. 37, at 242 (J. Madison) (E. Bourne ed. 1901). Note, however, that
the judicial boundaries for Madison were much sharper than they are for the modem
surveyor:
It is not unfrequently a question of real mcety in legislative bodies whether
the operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the
legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive power being restrained
within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the
judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects of
usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and
defeat themselves.
rd. No. 48, at 340.
8 For courts to reassign congressional committee seats would be no less
intrusive than for Congress to enact a law forbidding the members of this
court from conferring on the decision of cases or forbidding specified
judges from sitting on cases of a particular type. If the courts would not
accept such invasions of their sphere, they ought not attempt the invasion
of Congress' sphere sought by appellants.
Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1181-82 (Bork, J., concurring).
9 "Questions of jurisdiction are questions of power, power not merely over the
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1. "UNIFORMITY OF PROCEEDING". CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL AUTHORITY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RULE-MAKING

POWER
Article I, section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution states that
"[e]ach House may determine the Rules of Its Proceedings."
In addition, article I addresses a number of specific legislative

2
procedures including quorums,' 0 adjournments," and roll calls.'

Congress, therefore, has a body of rules consisting of those
provisions specifically enumerated in the Constitution, as well
as a set of standing rules adopted individually by the Senate 13
and the House of Representatives 14 pursuant to the authority

of article I, section 5, clause 2. Furthermore, each chamber is
case at hand but power over issues and over other branches of government." Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (President Reagan's pocket
veto of certain legislation challenged by 33 members of the House of Representatives
and United States Senate), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987).
"
10 "[A] Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do business.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, ci. 1.
"
""[A] smaller Number [than a Quorum] may adjourn from day to day.
Id. "Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that m which the
two Houses shall be sitting." Id. at art. I, § 5, cl.4.
,2"[T]he Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall,
at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal." Id. at art. I, §
5, el. 3; "[T]he Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the
Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of
each House respectively." Id. at art. I, § 7, cl.2.
" The Senate Rules are catalogued in the SENATE MANUAL CoNTAIINO THnESTANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BusiNEss OF THE UNnTED
STATES SENATE, S.Doc. No. 98-i, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter SENATE
MANUAL]. As a continuing body the Senate does not adopt new rules at the beginning

of each Congress. See Senate Rule V- "The rules of the Senate shall continue from one
Congress, to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules."
SENATE MANUAL, at

5.

11House rules are adopted at the beginning of each Congress by vote of the
members and can be found m the CoNsTITUTIoN, JEmFERsON's MANUAL AND THE RULES
OF TE HOUSE OF REEsENTATvEs, H.R. Doc. No. 99-279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987)
[hereinafter HousE RULES AND MANUAL]. Compiled by Thomas Jefferson when he was
Vice-President, Jefferson's Manual was incorporated into the House Rules in 1837.
Jefferson recognized that whether the rules be
in all cases the most rational or not is really not of so great importance.
It is much more material that there should be a rule to go by than what
that rule is; that there may be a uniformity of proceeding m business not
subject to the caprice of the speaker or the captiousness of the members.
HousE RULEs AND MANUAL, at

115-16.
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governed by statutory provisions which have the force of congressional rules,' 5 precedents of each chamber, 16 and informal
7
practices and customs.'
The historical records of the constitutional convention indicate that the general grant of rule-making authority in article
I, section 5, clause 2 generated no discussion. 8 Even the debate
surrounding the enumerated provisions pertaining to quorums,' 9 adjournments, 20 and roll calls 21 was brief and relatively

uneventful.?
Clearly, the lack of attention the framers gave to the congressional rules provisions reflects the necessity of granting the

11See, e.g., Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974); Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (1970); Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 99601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
,6Recent Senate precedents have been collected by parliamentarian emeritus Floyd
M. Riddick in SENATE PROCEDUaR PRECEDENTS AND PACTICES,S.Doc. No. 97-2 (1981).
The early precedents of the House are found in A. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE
HousE or REPRESENTATiVES (1907) and C. CANNON, CANNON's PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATVES (1935). Recent House precedents have been compiled in
DEscam.ni's PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
" See W.J. OLESZEK, CONORESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND nM POLICY PROCESS 11
(1984).
Congress is regulated not only by formal rules, but by informal ones that
influence legislative procedure and members behavior.
Folkways
are unwritten norms of behavior that members are
expected to observe.
Several of the more important are "legislative
work" (members should concentrate on congressional duties and not be
publicity seekers), "courtesy" (members should be solicitous toward their
colleagues and avoid personal attacks on them), and "specialization"
(members should master a few policy areas and not try to impress their
colleagues as a "jack of all trades").

Id.
" See THE RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 180, 245-56 (M. Farrand
ed. 1937) [hereinafter Farrand]; 1787 DRAFTING Tm U.S. CoNsTrrTnoN 672-75 (W
Benton ed. 1986) [hereinafter Benton]; C. WAURN, Tm MAKING OF
CONSTITUION
412-26 (1937).
" See Farrand, supra note 18, at 180, 245-56, 305; Benton, supra note 18, at 66772.
, Farrand, supra note 18, at 180, 258, 260-62; Benton, supra note 18, at 681-84;
C. WARREN, supra note 18, at 426-28.
1,Farrand, supra note 18, at 180, 254-56; Benton, supra note 18, at 675-80; C.
WARREN, supra note 18, at 429-31.
"1Although the journals kept by James Madison of Virginia and James McHenry
of Maryland document slightly different chronologies, apparently most of the debate on
art. I, § 5 took place on August 10 and II, 1787. Benton, supra note 18, at 656-84.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 76

legislative branch authority to fashion rules by which it can
administer its constitutionally delegated powers. 23 In his landmark commentary, Justice Story observed the following:
No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing each House to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If the power did not exist, it would be utterly
impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at
all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order. The
humblest assembly of men is understood to possess this power,
and it would be absurd to deprive the councils of the nation
of a like authority 24
In recogmzing congressional rule-making authority, the framers
were doing nothing more than recognizing textually what was
considered by many at the time to be an inherent ability 25 The
Constitution, therefore, recognizes that the legislative branch

23 "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
Umted States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
2
1 J. STORY, ComMENTARIs ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UN=ITE STATES § 837
(1873).
21Thomas Jefferson illustrated this assumption in his comments on the Residence
Bill of 1790:
Every man, and every body of men on earth, possesses the rlgh[t] of selfgovernment: they receive it with their being from the hand of nature.
Individuals exercise it by their single will: collections of men, by that of
their majority; for the law of the majority is the natural law of every
society of men. When a certain description of men are to transact together
a particular business, the times and places of their meeting and separating
depend on their own will; they make a part of the natural right of selfgovernment. This, llke all other natural rights, may be abridged or modified
in it's [sic] exercise, by their own consent, or by the law of those who
depute them, if they meet in the right of others: but so far as it is not
abridged or modified, they retain it as a natural right, and may exercise it
in what form they please, either exclusively by themselves, or in association
with others, or by others altogether, as they shall agree.
2 THE FOUNDERS CONsTTmoN 300 (P.B. Kurland ed. 1987) (quoting from 17 TaE
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 195 (J. Boyd ed. 1950)).
In the preface to is Manual of Parliamentary Practice, Jefferson notes that "[flor
some of the most familiar forms no written authority is or can be quoted, no writer
have supposed it necessary to repeat what all were presumed to know." HousE RuL.s
AND MANUAL, supra note 14, at 111-12 n.9. Cf. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1 (1825) (early discussion on the capacity of the judicial branch to determine
its rules of proceeding).
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must have a near exclusive ability to determine its rules of
26

procedure.
These rules, which the Senate and the House adopted imtially at the beginmng of the first Congress,2 7 were descendants
of the rules that governed the English Parliament. 28 As noted

Supreme Court has noted the following:
[When the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act
alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly
and precisely defined the procedure for such action.

2The

Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one
House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so
in explicit, unambiguous terms.
One imght also include another "exception" to the rule that congressional action having the force of law be subject to the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses. Each House has the power to act alone
in determimng specified internal matters. Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3 and § 5, cl.
2. However, this "exception" only empowers Congress to bind itself and
is noteworthy only insofar as it further indicates the Framers' intent that
Congress not act in any legally binding manner outside a closely circumscribed legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated instances.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 n.21 (1983).
" When the 30th of the 59 representatives elected to the First Congress
reached New York on April 1, 1789, the assembled quorum promptly chose
as Speaker of the House Frederick A. C. Muhlenberg of Pennsylvama.
The next day Muhlenberg appointed a committee of 11 representatives to
draw up the first rules of procedure, which the House adopted April 7.
The first standing committee of the House-a seven-member Committee
on Elections-was chosen April 13, and its report accepting the credentials
of 49 members was approved April 18. By then, the House already'was
debating its first piece of legislation, a tariff bill.
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CoNGaEss 41 (3d ed. 1982).
Courtesy, dignity and informality marked the proceedings of the Senate in
the early days of the Republic. A body that on a chill mormng might leave
its seats to gather around the fireplace had no need for an elaborate system
of procedure and rules. At the first session in 1789 the Senate adopted
only 20 short rules, a number deemed sufficient to control the proceedings
of a Senate no larger than some modem-day congressional committees.
Id. at 79; see 127 CONG. Rac. S1284-95 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1981) (statement of Sen.
Byrd).
. Jefferson noted the relation of the parliamentary law to the early legislative
procedure of Congress:
But to what system of rules is he to recur, as supplementary to those of
the Senate? To this there can be but one answer: To the system of
regulations adopted for the government of some one of the parliamentary
bodies within these States, or of that which has served as a prototype to
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in Holdsworth's history, they owed a great deal to the common
lawNo doubt the procedural rules of the common law were
gravely defective; but they had at least one merit-they discountenanced the very archaic legal ideas wich so seriously
hampered the representative assemblies of the continent. They
were capable of a certain amount of development and adaptation; and the men who spent their lives working and developing them were the men who were best fitted to create a
workable set of rules for the guidance of a representative
assembly 29
Even today, the House turns to "general parliamentary law"
for guidance in adopting its rules at the beginning of each
30
Congress.

most of them. This last is the model which we have all studied, while we
are little acquainted with the modifications of it in our several States. It is
deposited, too, in publications possessed by many, and open to all. Its
rules are probably as wisely constructed for governing the debates of a
deliberative body, and obtaining its true sense, as any which can become
known to us; in the acquiescence of the Senate, hitherto, under the references to them, has given them the sanction of the approbation.
HousE RULEs AND MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 286 n. a.
2 W HoLDswoRTH, HoLDswoRTH's HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW" ANGLO-SAXON
ANTiQUnrIEs, THE MEDIEVAL COMMON LAW 431 (1923); see 4 W HOLDSWORTH, HOLDSWORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: THE COMMON LAW AND ITS RIVALS 174-78 (1924)
(16th century parliamentary procedure) [hereinafter W HOLDsWORTH, THE COMMON
LAW AND ITS RIVALS].

The most striking feature of the procedure of Parliament continued to be
the influence exercised by the forms and conceptions of the common
law.
Firstly, we have seen that the whole fabric of Parliamentary
procedure was regarded as a special law governing Parliament. It was the
"lex et consuetudo Parliamenti," which governed the High Court of Parliament, just as the procedural rules of the common law, the civil law, or
the canon law, governed the various courts which exercised jurisdiction in
the English state. Secondly, this law was a customary law to be ascertained
mainly by the precedents to be collected from the records of Parliament.
It therefore possessed all the flexibility and adaptability of customary law;
and this was no small advantage at this time of conflict. Thirdly, it was,
like the common law itself, a permanent and independent body of customary law.
6 W HoLDswoRTH, TEn COMMON LAW AND ITS RIVALs, supra note 29, at 88-89
(footnotes omitted).
3 HousE RULES AND MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 60.
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Since the rules are not self-enforcing, each house of Congress has the authority to amend its rules unilaterally, as well
as suspend, waive, or even ignore them altogether

31

As one

observer of the legislative process noted, "the legislative rules
of Congress are essentially endogenous.
Ifthese rules are
enforced rigorously and consistently, it is only because Con-

''
gress chooses to do so. 32

II.

"ALL

MATTERS OF METHOD"

THE JUDICIAL DEFINITION

OF CONGRESSIONAL RULE-MAKING POWER

A.

Ballin to Yellin. Illusory Limits on the Judicial Power to
Review CongressionalRules

While the propriety of congressional rules had been challenged on earlier occasions, 33 the 1891 decision of United States
3 [T]he ways in wiuch the House applies its rules are relatively predictable,
at least in comparison with the Senate.
Moreover, even the ways in
which the House frequently waives, supplants, or supplements its regular
rules with special, temporary procedures generally fall into a relatively
limited number of recognizable patterns.
Underlying most of the rules that Representatives may invoke, and
the procedures the House may follow, is a fundamentally important premise-that a majority of Members ultimately should be able to work their
will on the floor.
S. BACH, AN INTRODUCTION To THE ListI.ATriv

PRocEss ON THE HousE FLOOR 1-2

(CoNoRSSioNAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 86-96G, 1986).
The essential characteristic of the Senate's rules, and the characteristic
that most clearly distinguishes its procedures from those of the House of
Representatives, is their emphasis on the rights and prerogatives of individual Senators.
[T]he Senate's rules give greater weight to the value
of full and free deliberation than they give to the value of expeditious
decisions.
Precisely because of the nature of its standing rules, the Senate cannot
rely on them exclusively. If all Senators took full advantage of their rights
under the rules whenever it nught be to their advantage, the Senate would
have great difficulty reaching timely decisions. Therefore, the Senate has
developed a variety of practices by which it sets aside some of its rules to
expedite the conduct of its business or to accommodate the needs and
interests of its members.
In most cases, these alternative arrangements
require the unanimous consent of the Senate-the explicit or implicit concurrence of each of the one hundred Senators.
Id. Rep. No. 87-176, 1986, revised March 6, 1987).
11S. Bach, The Nature of Congressional Rules (Sept. 3-6, 1987) (paper prepared
for delivery at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association;
Chicago, Illinois).
11 Although not the subject of judicial consideration, the following account of an
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v. Ballin3 4 provided the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to articulate the scope of review applicable to congressional

rules, The rule in controversy was House Rule XV which provided that the members present in the chamber but not voting
would be "counted and announced in determining the presence

of a quorum to do business." 35 Prior to the adoption of this
rule in 1890, conventional wisdom held that the constitutional
quorum requirement 36 could be satisfied only if a majority of
members actually voted on the proposition before them. This
meant that those opposed to a proposition could, even though

present in the chamber, defeat a quorum by not voting.

7

In this context, the importers Ballin, Joseph & Co. argued,

in response to an unfavorable decision by the Board of United
States General Appraisers, that an act imposing certain import

duties was invalid since it was approved by less than a majority
vote and, therefore, allegedly in the absence of a constitutional
quorum.3

Although addressing the alternative argument that

incident involving John Quincy Adams provides an excellent early illustration of the
type of problems a congressional rule can present:
In 1836 John Quincy Adams challenged a House practice, begun m 1792,
of refusing to receive petitions and memorials on the subject of slavery.
Adams offered a petition from citizens of Massachusetts for the abolition
of slavery in the District of Columbia. His action led to a protracted debate
and the adoption of a resolution by 117-68 vote directing that any papers
dealing with slavery "shall, without being either printed or referred, be
laid upon the table and that no further action whatever shall be had
thereon."
Adams, who considered adoption of the resolution to be a violation
of the Constitution and the rules of the House reopened the issue m 1837
by asking the Speaker how to dispose of a petition he had received from
22 slaves. Southerners moved at once to censure Adams. The move failed,
but the House agreed, 163-18, that "slaves do not possess the right of
petition secured to the people of the United States by the Constitution."
Further agitation led the House in 1840 to adopt, by a vote of 114-108, a
rule that no papers "praying the abolition of slavery
shall be received
by tis House or entertained in any way whatever." Four years later,
however, the rule was rescinded by a vote of 108-80.
CoNGREssioNAL QuARTERLY's GUmE TO CoNGREss, supra note 27, at 46.
3' 144 U.S. 1 (1891).
Id. at 5.
36 See supra note 10.
" TaE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITE STATES OF AMERICA: ANA]Ysis AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1973).
3s'In re Ballin, 45 F 170 (C.C. S.D.N.Y.) (rev'g the Decision of the Board of
United States General Appraisers), rev'd, 144 U.S. 1 (1891).
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the act should be given a different construction, 39 the Supreme
Court found the question of whether the legislation was legally
passed of greater importance. 40

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brewer noted that
the judiciary had the power to consider whether a bill was
validly enacted; 4' and, when the judiciary makes this determi-

nation, the entries m the House journal42 "must be assumed to
speak the truth. ' 4 After referring to the journal, the Court
accepted as fact that when the vote occurred a majority of

members were present in the chamber although less than a
majority actually voted. 44 The Court was left to consider, there-

fore, whether Congress had properly exercised its rule-making
authority in approving the Rule XV method of determining the

constitutionally required quorum. 45

The Court refused to overturn the rule stating that "[n]either

do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of
such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With

11U.S. v,Bailin, 144 U.S. 1 at 9-11 (1891).
' Id. at 3.
" "Whenever a question arises in a court of law of the existence of a
statute, or of the time when a statute took effect, or of the precise terms
of a statute, the judges who were called upon to decide it have a right to
resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of
conveying to the judicial mind clear and satisfactory answer to such ques"
tions;
Id. (quoting Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499, 511 (1868)); see J. Grant,
Judicial Control of the Legislative Process: The Federal Rule, 3 WEST. PoL. QUART.
364, 379-84 (1950); see also Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Enactment
Process: Louisiana's "Journal Entry" Rule, 41 LA. L. REv 1187 (1981); Comment,
Judicial Review of the Legislative Process of Enactment: An Assessment Following
Childers v. Couey, 30 A., L. Rav. 495 (1979) (judiciary reviewing Alabama state
legislature procedures).
2 "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time
to time
"
publish the same, 6xcepting such Parts as may m their Judgement require Secrecy.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl.
3; see supra note 12; see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,
680 (1891):
[I]t is not competent for the appellants to show, from the journals of
either House, from the reports of committees or from other documents
printed by authority of Congress, that the enrolled bill
contained a
section that does not appear in the enrolled act in the custody of the State
Department.
41 Bailin, 144 U.S. at 4.
, Id.
41Id. at 4-5.
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the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.' '46
Despite its conclusive language, the Court was unwilling to
concede final authority to the legislative branch:
[The House] may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonablerelation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method
are open to the determination of the house, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would
be better, more accurate or even-more just. It is no objection
to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and enforced for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not onewhich once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the house,
and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the,
47
challenge of any other body or tribunal.
The standard announced in Ballin, therefore, recognized
that Congress has the power to make its own procedural rules,
but the courts have the power to determine whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was, in effect, reviewed by the Court
and allowed to stand only after the Court was satisfied that it
conformed to these criteria: (1) the rule complied with "constitutional restraints" ;48 (2) the rule violated no fundamental
rights; 49 and (3) there was a "reasonable relationship between"
the rule's method and "the result sought to be attained." 0
Ballin, far from carving out an area .in which judicial review is
strictly limited, established an expansive role for the Court in
reviewing legislative rules of procedure. This proposition was
supported and even expanded by the Court's decision in United
States v Smith.5'

- Id. at 5.
Id. (emphasis added).
41

48
49

Id.
Id.

50Id.

5, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
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The rule at issue in Smith allowed for the reconsideration
of a Senate vote on an executive branch nomination after
notification of confirmation or rejection had been sent to the
president. 52 The executive branch challenged this rule after the
Senate adopted motions requesting President Hoover to return
for reconsideration a confirmation resolution of one of his
appointments to the Federal Power Commission. 53 The President refused this request 5 4 and the Senate, despite the position
of the executive branch, subsequently reconsidered and rejected
55
the nomination.
The Court admitted that "[tihe question primarily at issue
relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to their
constitutionality "-6 Judicial review was predicated on the fact
The pivotal provisions are 11 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII which read:
3. When a nomnation is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the
majority may move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the
vote was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual executive
session of the Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation or rejection
of a nomination shall have been sent to the President before the expiration
of the time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the motion
to reconsider shall be accompamed by a motion to request the President
to return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the
vote on a nomnation may be laid on the table without prejudice to the
nomination, and shall be a final disposition of such motion.
4. Normnations confimed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned
by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited
for making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate.
Id. at 30-31.
51Id. at 28.
m Id., see President's Message to the Senate Refusing to Return Senate Resolutions
of Advice and Consent for Appointments to the Federal Power Commission, PuB.
PAPERS 11-14 (Jan. 10, 1931).
I am advised that these appointments were constitutionally made, with the
consent of the Senate formally commumcated to me and that the return
of the documents by me and reconsidered by the Senate would be ineffective to disturb the appointees in their offices. I cannot admit the power in
the Senate to encroach upon the Executive functions by the removal of a
duly appointed executive officer under the guise of reconsideration of his
nomination.
President's Statement About Refusal to Resubmit Federal Power Commssion Appointments to the Senate, PuB. PAPERS 13-16 (Jan. 10, 1931) (" 'I am advised by the Attorney
General that these appointments were constitutionally made, [and] are not subject to
52

recall.

' ").

Smith, 286 U.S. at 29.
-%Id. at 33.
's
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that "the construction to be given to the rules affects persons

other than members of the Senate.

.

57

Despite its recogm-

tion that, "[iun deciding the issue, [we] must give great weight
to the Senate's present construction of its own rules," 5 8 the
Court held that the history and the precedents of the Senate,
both before and after the incident in question, supported an
interpretation of the rules that precluded reconsideration of the
appointment by the Senate.59 In short, the Court substituted its
6
interpretation of the Senate rules for that of the Senate. 0
Seventeen years later, the scope of review delineated in
Ballin and Smith allowed the Court to decide Christoffel v
United States.61 The Christoffel Court faced a fact pattern that
arose out of the rules of a House committee acting in an
investigatory capacity, 62 not out of proceedings relating to floor
debate. 63 Once again, the rule m controversy pertained to the
method by which the committee determined a quorum. 64

:7

Id.

" Id.
To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction different
from that adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was under
debate is a senous and delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution
commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the
function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A rule
designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the vital function
of advising and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover,
should receive from the Court the most sympathetic consideration.
Id. at 48.
19 Id. at 37-48.
60 The Court's decision in Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919),
provides an interesting contrast. Although concluding that the "question would be
justiciable," id. at 279, the Court deferred to Congress' application of art. 1, § 7, cl. 2
requiring a two-thirds vote of each House to pass a bill over a presidential veto. Writing
for the entire court, Justice White concluded that the "application of the rule was the
result of no mere formal following of what had gone before but came from conviction
expressed, after deliberation, as to its correctness by many illustrious men." Id. at 284.
6- 338 U.S. 84 (1948).
12 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) ("We are of [the] opinion
that the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function."); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON CoNs.
OPERATiONS, 94TH CONG., 2D Sass., LEADNG CASES ON CONG. INVESTIGATORY POWER
(Comm. Pnnt 1976).
63 Chnstoffel, 338 U.S. at 85. Rule XII(1)(a)(1) provides: "The Rules of the House
are the rules of its committees and subcommittees so far as applicable.
" House
RULES AND MANUAL, supra note 14, at 405.
6 Chnstoffel, 338 U.S. at 87; cf. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950)
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At the beginning of the committee session, a call of the roll
indicated that a quorum was present. 65 Three hours later, the
petitioner allegedly made perjurious statements 66 for which he
was later convicted. 67 Evidence at trial suggested that less than
a majority of the members were present when the statements
were made. While agreeing "that the presence of a quorum
was an indispensable part of the offense charged," the trial
judge instructed the jury to find that a quorum existed as long
as a majority of the committee was present at the beginning of
the session. 68 Justice Murphy, writing for the majority, held
that this instruction was improper-that a quorum consisting
of a majority of the committee members had to exist at the
time the statements were made for the committee to constitute
a "competent tribunal" under the District of Columbia perjury
69
statute.
Justice Jackson, writing in dissent on behalf of Chief Justice
Vinson and Justice Reed, rejected the latitude taken by the
majority*
Wihat Congress may do by express rule it may also do by
custom and practice. There is no requirement, constitutional
or otherwise, that its body of parliamentary law must be
recorded in order to be authoritative. In the absence of objection raised at the time, and in the absence of any showing
of a rule, practice or custom to the contrary, this Court has
the duty to presume that the conduct of a Congressional
Committee, in its usual course of business, conforms to both
the written and unwritten rules of the House which created
it. "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.
" Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. This Court accordingly can
neither determine the rules for either House or Congress nor
require those rules to be expressed with any degree of explicitness other than that chosen by the respective Houses,

(Absence of a quorum was not available as a defense when the objection was not raised
before the committee.).
Christoffel, 338 U.S. at 86.
" Id.
67 "Every person who, having taken an oath or affirmation before a competent
tribunal,
wilfully and contrary to such oath or affirmation states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, shall be guilty of perjury.
Id. at 85 n.2 (quoting District of Columbia Code, § 22-2501, 31 Stat. 1329).
"Id. at 86.
Id. at 89-90.
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The House has adopted the rule and practice that a
quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and
until the point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the
Court, in effect, invalidates that rule despite the limitations
consistently imposed upon courts where such an issue is tendered! 0

The holding of Ballin, when considered in light of Smith and
Christoffel, makes it quite clear, however, that "the limitations
consistently imposed" are largely without force. Although now
nearly twenty-five years old, the Supreme Court's most recent

discussion of the scope of review of congressional rules, 71 Yellin

10Id. at 91, 95.
71 Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the analogous issues raised by
those more recent cases which explore the boundaries of the speech or debate clause
("for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not
be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1) cannot escape reference.
See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (A congressional employee brought suit
against a congressman for employment discrimination. While the majority did not reach.
the speech or debate clause issue, it did hold that the petitioner had a cause of action.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented, arguing that
the case presented serious separation of powers concerns.); Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (Plaintiff brought suit to obtain an
injunction against the issuance of a subpoena by a Senate subcommittee. The Court
held that the issuance of the subpoena was "an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes," of congressional business.); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306
(1973) (A suit was brought by parents of children cited for disciplinary problems in a
House subcommittee report. The Court concluded that the speech or debate clause
barred relief from committee members and staff for introducing the material at committee hearings, for referring the report to the Speaker of the House, and for voting
for publication of the report since these were all legislative acts.)
In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902
(1972), action was taken against Senator Gravel to restrain publication of the Pentagon
Papers. The Court held that private publication was unprotected and offered the following standard:
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is
speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to
reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the deliberative and
commumcative processes by which Members participate in committee and
House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.
Another case of particular importance, although not always found under the speech
or debate rubric, is Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Congressman Adam
Clayton Powell, responding to a resolution excluding him from the 90th Congress for
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v. United States,72 continues to stand for this assertion 3
Like Christoffel, the controversy in Yellin centered around
the application of a House committee rule74 to a witness subpoenaed pursuant to a committee investigation. In reversing a
contempt of Congress conviction, the majority held that the
committee failed to follow its own rule relating to the interrogation of a witness in executive session and, thus, violated the
witness' right, granted by the rule, to be questioned in private.7 5

mishandling House funds, brought an action to compel House members and employees
to seat hun as a duly elected Member of Congress. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Warren concluded that "though this action may be dismissed against the Congressmen petitioners are entitled to maintain their action against House employees and
to judicial review of the propnety of the decision to exclude petitioner Powell." Id. at
506. By determimng that the action against Powell was an exclusion rather than an
expulsion, the Court avoided reaching the question of whether it had the power to
review House expulsion standards. Since Powell clearly met the constitutional requirements of age, residence, and citizenship, the Court saw no need to apply art. I, § 5, cl.
1, which provides that each House is "the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.
" Id. at 522. Thus, the Court had the final word on
the application of explicit nondiscretionary constitutional requirements and only indirectly on internal congressional procedure. Of interest is Professor Wechsler's observation, articulated in another context a decade before Powell, that though presenting
"issues of the most important constitutional dimension,
the seating or expulsion of
a Senator or Representative" is not a proper matter for review by the judiciary. Wechsler,
supra note 4, at 8.
For discussions of the evolution of the speech or debate doctnne see Reinstein and
Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARv L. REv 1113
(1973); Note, Speech or Debate Immunity: Preserving Legislative Independence While
Cutting Costs of CongressionalImmunity, 60 No=u DAim L. Ruv. 589 (1985).
- 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
71 Id. at 114.
74 The particular Committee Rule involved, Rule IV, provides in part:
"IV-Executive and Public Hearings:
A-Executive:
"(1) If a majority of the Committee or Subcommittee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might
endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the
reputation of other individuals, the Committee shallinterrogatesuch
witness in an Executive Session for the purpose of determining the
necessity or advisability of conducting such interrogationthereafter
in a public hearing.
B-Public Hearings:
(1)All other hearings shall be public."
Id. at 114-15 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 123.
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The logic of the majority holding was uncomplicated: "The
Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's
case meticulously It is not too exacting to require that the
Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own rules." ' 76
As the dissent pointed out, however, this conclusion necessarily depends on the Court rejecting the interpretation of
the rule Congress offered and concluding that the congressional
committee had indeed failed to follow its own rule. 7 Citing the
restrictive language of Ballin78 and Smith, 79 Justice White wrote
on behalf of the dissent that "[w]hile the testimony is reasonably clear as to the Committee's construction and application
of its own rule, if there were any doubt about the matter it is
not our place to resolve every doubt against the Committee." 8 0
Clearly, the distance that the dissenters were willing to wander
into the procedural briar patch of the legislative branch was
far shorter than that of the majority 81
Thus, while offering an obligatory nod to the merits of
judicial restraint, the Supreme Court, without so much as a
blush, has embraced an all-inclusive scope of review of congressional rules in a variety of contexts. In Ballin, the Court
examined the constitutionality of a rule that construed the
quorum requirement found in the text of the Constitution.82 In
Smith, the Court justified going one step further in reviewing
the application of an admittedly constitutional rule by noting
the effect application of the rule had on a private party 83
Christoffel presented a similar factual scenario with the Court
concluding that a facially constitutional rule was interpreted

76 Id. at 124.

Id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting).

78 Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5.

286 U.S. at 33.
Yellin, 374 U.S. at 146.
The role that the courts play in adjudicating questions involving the rules

7Smith,
"

of either house must of necessity be a limited one, for the manner in which
a house or committee of Congress chooses to run its business ordinarily

raises no justiciable controversy.
Even when a judicial controversy is
presented, the function of the courts is a narrow one.
Id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
12 Ballin, 144 U.S. at 1; see supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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incorrectly 84 Finally, Yellin illustrates once again the Court's
willingness to review congressional rules for compliance when
a private party is involved.8 Following the Supreme Court's lead, the more recent decisions by the lower federal courts6 generally echo this reluctance
to recognize a jurisdictional lirmtation. 17 In the final analysis,
the courts more often than not have chosen to draw the boundaries of judicial review deep and wide rather than choosing a
88
line of restraint.

B.

Vander Jagt to Kurtz: "'Standing" in the Way of Judicial

Power
The theme of the District of Columbia Circuit decisions
involving review of congressional rules has been one of concern
about the separation of powers problems raised by judicial
consideration. 9 The opinions have most often given force to

" See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
,s See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.

"Due to geographical proximity, case law at the U.S. Court of Appeals level has
been confined almost exclusively to the D.C. Circuit. But see Texas Ass'n of Concerned
Taxpayers v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Where
a constitutional provision governing the mode of internal operation of Congress contains a word
or phrase susceptible of more than one meaning, and Congress has given that word or
phrase an interpretation consistent with the limitations on authority contained in the
provisions, the courts should not intrude.
"), reh'g denied, 776 F.2d (1985) (en
banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1151 (1986); Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 125 (9th Cir.
1977) ("We are not in a position
to make a better judgment about how the Arizona
House of Representatives should go about its business than that House can make. Even
if the court could, it ought not to.").
" See infra notes 89-127 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
0 See Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287
(D.C. Cir. 1982) ("To decide [in favor of intervention] would subject congressional
enactments to the threat of judicial invalidation on each occasion of dispute over the
content or effect of a House or Senate rule."); United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon,
642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[So-called political questions are demed judicial
scrutiny, not only because they invite courts to intrude into the province of coordinate
branches of government, but also because courts are fundamentally under-equipped to
formulate national policies or develop standards of conduct for matters not legal in
nature."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 999 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
589 F.2d 582, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Although the courts will intervene to protect
constitutional rights from infringement by Congress, including its committees and members,
where constitutional rights are not violated, there is no warrant for the judiciary
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this concern by paying homage, albeit more and more sparingly, to the separation of powers concepts embodied in the
political question doctrine. 90 Nevertheless, these decisions continue to assert a far-ranging junsdictional authority9l to review
Congress' in-house procedural rules.
The decision in Vander Jagt v O'NeilP2 presents the most
complete expression of the D.C. Circuit's doctrine relating to
judicial review of congressional rules. In Vander Jagt, a group
of House members challenged the allocation of a disproportionate number of House committee seats to Democrats. 93 After
noting that "[t]his circuit has previously expressed its reluctance
to review congressional operating rules, though it has never
denied its power to do so, ' ' 94 the court exarmned at length the
scope of review articulated in Ballin and Smith. The court then

to interfere with the internal procedures of Congress.
" (citations omitted)), cert,
denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("In deference to the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers, the
judiciary must take special care to avoid intruding into a constitutionally delineated
prerogative of the Legislative Branch."); Consumers Umon of United States v. Periodical
Correspondents Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[This case is] not
justiciable by reason of the textually demonstrable commitment of such rules to the
legislative branch of government.
"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
10 Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found the textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see infra notes 92-127 and accompanying text.
Compare Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 601
(1976) ("The cases which are supposed to have established the political question doctnne
required no such extra-ordinary abstention from judicial review; they called only for the
ordinary respect by the courts for the political domain.") with Redish, JudicialReview
and the "Political Question", 79 Nw U.L. Ray. 1031, 1032-33 (1984-85) ("[I]n a
number of cases in which the Court purported not to invoke the political question
doctrine, it was in fact applying most of the doctrine's precepts in rendering its decision.").
"1 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
91Id. at 1167.
94 Id. at 1172-73.
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concluded "that Art. I simply means that neither we nor the
Executive Branch may tell Congress what rules it must adopt.
Article I does not alter our judicial responsibility to say what
rules Congress may not adopt because of constitutional infirmity." 95 The court went on to admit candidly "that this raises
some doubt about the intelligibility of the 'textually committed'
aspect of the political question doctnne.''96 Indeed, the opinion
lends support to the premise that the doctrine is only of academic interest, observing that it is "far more useful to examine
'case-by-case' whether [it] would be unwise to intrude in 'po97
litical' controversies.'
Significantly, the court did not find a threshold bar to
justiciability in applying the standing doctnne9 8 to the plaintiffs

Id. at 1173.
"Id.
97 Id. at 1174.
" Although Justice Douglas had warned that "[g]eneralizations about standing to
sue are largely worthless as such
.," Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970), a traditional standing analysis has been characterized
most often as requiring the following: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) an available judicial remedy. C.
WRIG T, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTcE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
2D § 3531 (1984). Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), illustrates the terminology of modern
standing theory:
Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to "show that
he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury "fairly
can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by
a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner does Art. III limit the federal
judicial power "to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role
consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally
thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process." Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. at 97.
Id. at 472 (footnote omitted). In commenting on the close relationship between the
"traceability" and "redressability" requirements, the Court has concluded that "[t]o
the extent there is a difference, it is that the former examines the causal connection
between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter
examnnes the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984). Important, too, is the Court's
discussion of the Article III "case" and "controversy" genesis of the standing doctrine:
In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. This
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either in their capacity as members of Congress or in their
capacity as private-party voters. 99 In his concurrence, Judge
Bork argued against granting standing, stating that "[w]hether
the requirement is rooted in Article III or in judicial prudence
the Supreme Court continues to regard the standing concept as informed by considerations of separation of powers."ii °°
The majority disagreed, choosing to grant standing to the plaintiffs and then disnussing the action in an exercise of the court's
10
remedial discretion. '
First proposed by Judge Carl McGowan,' 0 2 the remedial
discretion doctrine was adopted by the D C. Circuit in Riegle
v Federal Open Market Committee'0 3 as a way of "translating
separation-of-powers concerns into principled decision

making.

"1104

In essence, the doctrine counsels the court to

inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction
and prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions it is founded
in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts m
a democratic society.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citations omitted); see Allen, 468 U.S. at
752 ("[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation
of powers."), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
"See McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. Rnv. 241,
265 (1981) ("Invoking the court's discretion to deny an equitable remedy when the
petitioner could get adequate relief from his fellow legislators seems to be the most
satisfying way of resolving these cases."); see also Note, The Justiciabilityof Congressional-PlantiffSuits, 82 CoLTm. L. REv. 526, 527 (1982) ("[C]ourts access for congressional plaintiffs [should] be primarily determined by traditional doctrines of standing,
focusing on the injury to the plaintiff's status and rights as a legislator."); Note,
CongressionalAccess to the FederalCourts, 90 HARv L. Rnv. 1632, 1634 (1977) ("By
treating all congressional suits alike, the courts have also obscured the institutional
problems peculiar to suits by individual congressmen to assert participatory rights.");
Comment, Standing Versus Justiciability: Recent Developments in ParticipatorySuits
Brought by CongressionalPlaintiffs, 1982 B.Y.U. L. RaV 371 (1982).
VVander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1180 (Bork, J., concurring). In his dissent in Barnes
v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1985), Judge Bork further articulated his view that
a standing decision necessarily encompasses separation of powers concerns:
"Standing" is one of the concepts courts have evolved to limit their
jurisdiction and hence to preserve the separation of powers.
Every
time a court expands the definition of standing, the definition of the
interests it is willing to protect through adjudication, the area of judicial
dormnance grows and the area of democratic rule contracts.
101Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1168.
10 See supra note 99.
0

656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
Id. at 881.
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dismiss suits brought by legislators "[w]here a congressional
plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute. . " o0
While concurring in the result, Judge Bork raised fundamental questions about the rationale used by the majority to
dismiss the suit:
Political question, like standing, is a doctnne that raises a
jurisdictional bar to judicial power, while remedial discretion,
as decribed in Judge Gordon's opimon for the majority, raises
no bar and grants the judiciary unfettered discretion to hear
a case or not, depending on the attractiveness of the idea.
My colleagues' disinclination to rest this case upon a
jurisdictional ground-whether that of standing or political
question-rests squarely upon the erroneous notion, expressed
in Riegle and reiterated today, that there must be judicial
power in all cases and that doctrines must not be adopted
06
which rmght frustrate that power.
Arguably, the Vander Jagt approach of factoring-in the separation of powers restraints as part of a strict remedial discretion
analysis, rather than a standing analysis, results in a very
narrow judicial role when the plaintiff is a member of Congress. 10 7 Remedial discretion, however, as the name implies,
provides not a -jurisdictional mandate for the court but rather
a choice. Furthermore, when the plaintiff is a private party,
the separation of powers element of the remedial discretion
08
doctrine is largely without force.1
9
In Gregg v Barrett,1 the court was presented with both
congressional plaintiffs and private-party plaintiffs claiming
105Id.
6
107

ander Jagi, 699 F.2d at 1184 (Bork, J., concurring).

See supra note 99.

11 Judge Bork argues against this result;
[S]eparation-of-powers considerations do not, strictly speaking, operate
here on the basis of the plaintiffs' status as legislators. Rather, in keeping
with the standing doctrine, my concern is with the separation-of-powers
implications of the hann alleged: "dinmnution of influence" and the legislative process. Appellants complain of this single harm in both of their
capacities.
Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1183 n.3 (Bork, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
1- 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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that their first amendment rights were violated because the
Congressional Record was not a verbatim transcript of congressional debate. 110 In dismissingthe complaint as to the congressional plaintiffs, Judge Mikva invoked the remedial
discretion doctrine, noting that the Congressmen could persuade their colleagues to enforce either existing rules or approve
a resolution requiring a verbatim transcript."' The court, however, rejected the appellees' argument that the private parties'
claim should be dismissed on grounds related to those articulated by the equitable discretion doctrine." 2 Indeed, the Gregg
opinion noted that "an important reason to withhold equitable
relief for congressional, plaintiffs is the possibility that other,
private plaintiffs may bring suit in a context less laden with
separation-of-powers concerns."" 3
4
Gregg, therefore, consistent with the holding in Riegle,1
recognized a clear role for the judiciary in examining congressional rules on behalf of private plaintiffs who qualify under
the separation-of-powers-purged standing analysis. In the end,
however, the Gregg court dismissed the private appellants' claim,
concluding that there is "no first amendment right to receive
a verbatim transcript of the proceedings of Congress." 11 5 Ironically, after embracing the jurisdictional authority to review
House rules on behalf of a private party, Judge Mikva concluded the opinion by observing that "[n]otwithstanding the
deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the
institution be allowed to manageits own affairs precludes us
from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem."" 6
The D C. Circuit's most recent response to a request to
review a rule of Congress is found in Kurtz v Baker "7 The
Id. at 540.
Id. at 545.
IU
n Brief for Appellee at 36; Gregg, 771 F.2d at 539.
113Gregg, 771 F.2d at 546.
"' Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881 ("While we discourage congressional plaintiffs in such
circumstances, it is probable that a private plaintiff could acquire standing to raise the

issue of unconstitutionality before a court.").
"I Gregg, 771 F.2d at 546,
116

Id. at 549.

M 829 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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appellant in Kurtz brought suit when the chaplains of the House
and Senate, pursuant to congressional rules, 1 8 refused a request
"to deliver secular remarks in both houses of Congress, during
the period each house reserves for morning prayer." 119 While
the district court reached the merits of the claim,' 20 the circuit
court concluded that the appellant failed to meet the article III
2
standing requirements.' '
As noted in Judge Ruth Ginsburg's dissent, the majority
incorporates the separation of powers analysis into its do6trine
of standing:
Although they acknowledge that Kurtz meets the core, injuryin-fact requirement, my colleagues nonetheless conclude that
Kurtz lacks standing because he cannot show causation, i.e.,
that his injury is "traceable to the chaplains' rejection of
Kurtz' requests" for a guest speaker bid. The majority emphasizes that the chaplains lacked authority to grant Kurtz's
requests in the face of the firm will of Congress, expressed
in its internal rules, to open sessions with prayer; they then
maintain, essentially, that Congress made and only Congress
can unmake the rules determining that prayer will be the
exclusive benediction upon the opening of legislative sessions.
If this is indeed the pivotal point, then the majority-notwithstanding its use of a "standing" label-is deciding not

'

House Rule VII states that "[tihe Chaplain shall attend at the commencement of each day's sitting of the House and open the same with

prayer.
" Rule XXIV provides that "[t]he daily order of business shall
be as follows: First. prayer by the Chaplain."
As for the Senate, it has long been provided by resolution that "the

Chaplain shall open each calendar day's session of the Senate with
prayer.
" Senate Rule IV(1)(a) regulates commencement of daily ses" Senate Rule IV(2)
sions, and provides for "prayer by the Chaplain.

refers to the "customary daily prayer by the Chaplain."
Id. at 1143.
19 Id.

at 1134.

110Id. at 1136-37.

,M,The complaint barely survives scrutiny under the first part, and thoroughly fails under the second part, of the test the Supreme Court has
developed for deternumng Article III standing: (1) there must be concrete
personal injury to the plaintiff, (2) such injury must be fairly traceable to
the challenged conduct, and (3) the injury must be "likely" to be redressed
if the relief sought is granted.
Id. at 1138.
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who may sue, but an anterior question, viz, what issues are
22
legitimately open to third branch resolution.
Notwithstanding the objections of Judge Ginsburg, this is precisely the function of the standing requirement123-to define the
limits of the court's article III jurisdictional power 12
In general, therefore, the D C. Circuit opinions recognize
that the judiciary cannot review the procedural rules of the
legislative branch without encountering a host of separation of
powers problems.' 25 Like the earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court, 2 6 the court of appeals, until Kurtz, had refused to find
that it lacked jurisdictional power. Instead, the court reserved
the discretionary right to impose self-limitations on review. This
analysis was accomplished either by pulling from the shelf the
remedial discretion doctrine when presented with legislator
plaintiffs or by using more traditional prudential limitations
when asked by private-party plaintiffs to review the procedural
rules of Congress.i27

III.

"To

SAY WHAT THE LAW

Is".

RECOGNIZING AN

ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL POWER
Although rendered meaningless by nearly one hundred years
of tolerance of judicial meddling in the realm of legislative
procedure, the proper role of the judiciary in this area, or more
accurately lack of role, was clearly stated by Justice Brewer in
U.S. v Ballin:'28 "With the courts the question is only one of

'1 Id. at 1148 (Ginsburg, R., J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
,2 [I]f the court were to order the chaplains to discontinue the program,
both houses would still have the power to invite guest chaplains to lead
them in prayer without the intervention of their official chaplains. While
such an order might provoke a conflict on a matter of constitutional
principle between the houses of Congress and this court, it would involve
a test of political will rather than of law because this court is without
authority to act outside the boundaries of Article III.
Kurtz, at 1144-45.
'12 See supra notes 89-116 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra notes 33-88 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 89-116 and accompanying text.
1'

-- 144 U.S. 1 (1891).
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power. The Constitution empowers each House to determine
its rules of proceedings. ' 1 29 The decisions from Ballin to Gregg
v. Barrett'3 ° have refused to accept this premise and have provided the rhetorical baggage that reduces it to insignificance.
3
For example, the court in Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, ' iroMcally but justifiably citing Ballin, stated that "[c]ourts and
commentators have long recognized that it is crucial to distinguish questions about whether judicial power exists, from questions about whether judicial power should be exercised."'3 2 This
reasoning allowed the court to conclude:
[While there are compelling prudential reasons why we should
not interfere in the House's distribution of committee seats,
it is nevertheless critical that we do not deny our jurisdiction
over the claims in this case. As long as it is conceivable that
the committee system could be manipulated beyond reason,
we should not abandon our constitutional obligation-our
duty and not simply our province-"to say what the law
33

is."1

In retort, Judge Bork agreed with the mandate of Marbury
v Madison 3 4 but not with the result of the majority's analysis:
Of course, when a court finds a jurisdictional bar to its
exercise of power, it does state what the law is. When, on
the other hand, a court claims a discretion, whose contours
are not suggested, to decide or not decide, the court refuses
35
to say what the law is.
Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury36 that
boundaries to judicial power do exist. He wrote that "[q]uestions
in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and

'2
ISO

Id. at 5.
771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see supra notes 33-116 and accompanying text.

13 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C, Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
1 Id. at 1170.
' Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
1-"5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
"3, Id. at 1185 (Bork, J., concumng).
"I Marbury,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
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laws, submitted- to the executive, can never be made in this
37

court.'

1

Separation of powers considerations, 138 given force in the

doctrine of standing, 139 demand that the judiciary recognize

11"Id. Chief Justice Marshall reiterated this theme in a speech delivered to Congress:
If the judicial power extended to every question under the constitution,- it
wouldinvolve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and
decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties' of the United
States, it would involve almost every subject on which the executive could
act. The division of power which the gentleman had stated, could exist no
longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.
Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (quoting Speech
of the Honorable John Marshall to the United States House of Representatives, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) Appendix at 3, 16 (1820)).
M'Understanding separation of powers objectives is a prerequisite to understanding
the concept's effect on standing methodology. Separate powers, implicit in the structure
of the Constitution, have been described "as a keystone for guaranteeing the liberty of
the people." Choper, supra note .3, at 263. With reference to a lineage that includes
Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, Professor Choper has summarized the views of
the founding fathers on the consequences that are avoided by maintaining a system of
divided powers:
While a number of the founding fathers-including Washington, Adams,
Jefferson, Jay, and Wilson-urged acceptance of the [separation of powers]
principle on the grounds of government efficiency, Madison's statement
that "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny" could as well have come from Montesquieu's pen. Wasington
voiced the same sentiment in his Farewell Address, cautiomng against "the
exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another"
because "the spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all
the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a red despotism." John Adams wrote that "it is-by balancing each
of these powers against the other two, that the efforts of human nature
towards tyranny can alone be checked and restrained, and any degree of
freedom preserved in the constitution." And Jefferson was equally confident in his opinmon that concentration of powers "in the same hand [either
Congress or the President] is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a
plurality of hands and not by a single one, 173 despots would surely be as
oppressive as one."
Id. at 264-65 (footnotes omitted).
'1' See supra note 98 and accompanying text. The mere assertion that separation
of powers notions are part of standing theory says nothing about how they influence
standing methodology. The Court's lack of guidance in this area has led one commentator to observe that "[p]recisely how separation-of-powers analysis advances doctrinal
application of the standing inquiry may be difficult to fathom." L. TRNE, AmEIicAN
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once and for all an absence of power to review in every instance
the procedural rules of Congress. A startling'limitation on the
court's ability to have the last word in the realm of constitutional interpretation? Not necessarily, for as Judge Bork has
observed, "it is of course precisely the function of the Article
III limitations on jurisdiction, through such doctrines as standing. and political question, to ensure that nonfrivolous claims
of unconstitutional action will go unreviewed by a court." 14°
oNAL LAW, 109 (1988).
CoNsmrr
For Judge Bork, the integration of separation of powers principles as a part of
standing methodology is accomplished by focusing on two inquiries aimed at the two
major components of the standing test-injury in fact and causation. First, a court must
ask if recognition and protection of an injury would unduly enhance the role of the
judiciary in relation to other branches. Thus, Judge Bork concluded in Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill that "[c]ourts may take cognizance only of injuries of certain types, and the
limitations are often defined less by the reality of the litigant's 'adverseness' than by the
courts' view of the legitimate boundaries of their own power." Vander Jagt at 1177.
Second, in reviewing causation a court must go beyond an "estimation of probabilities" and examine the effect granting standing would have on the spread of judicial
authority. " '[C]ausation' in this context," argues Judge Bork, "is something of a term
of art, taking into account not merely an estimate of effects but also considerations
related to the constitutional separation of powers as that concept defines the proper role
of courts in the Amencan governmental structure." Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey,
809 F.2d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (standing denied to nonprofit membersip corporation
organized to assist Haitian refugees and two members who challenged a federal program
to interdict undocumented aliens on the high seas).
See generally Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis,
1984 Wis. L. Rv. 37, 42 (1984).
When a plaintiff asserts what is in the Court's view a "generalized gnevance," separation of powers concerns counsel that the Court consider
disposing of the case on prudential rather than article III grounds, reserving
for the legislative branch the opportunity to determine ultimately the best
forum for resolving the controversy.
Id. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLx U.L. REv 881, 882 (1983).
[S]tanding is a crucial and inseparable element of [separation of powers],
whose disregard will inevitably produce-as it has during the past few
decades-an overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance.
[C]ourts need to accord greater weight than they have in recent times to
the traditional requirement that the plaintiffs alleged injury be a particularized one, which sets him apart from the citizenry at large.
Id. Note, "More Than an Intuition, Less Than a Theory"- Toward a Coherent Doctrine
of Standing, 86 CoL.m. L. REv 564, 593 (1986) ("Standing to raise constitutionally
grounded claims should be approached by first recognizing rights derived directly from
the Constitution as legally cognizable, and then examining whether the right so derived
accrues to the people in gross or in personam.").
I- Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1183 (Bork, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Thus, in Vander Jagt the injury alleged-diminution of
influence-defined the issue which the legislator plaintiffs suc-

cessfully requested the court to examine. 41 A threshold separation of powers analysis, however, counsels against recognizing
this as a judicially cognizable injury for the purpose of granting
standing. Furthermore, in contrast to the dynamics of the remedial discretion doctrine, standing, permeated by separation

of powers concerns, has a similar jurisdictional effect when the
plaintiff is a private party 142 Kurtz v Baker, 41 moreover,
illustrates that even when a judicially cognizable injury is found,

the separation-of-powers-aware standing test may foreclose jurisdiction?'44

Assuming, arguendo, that a particular rule falls within the
set of those questions effectively outside the reach of the judiciary does not necessarily require the conclusion that the rule
is above scrutiny for constitutional compliance. To suggest that

members of Congress could adopt rules in contravention of the
Constitution ignores the fact that all public officers are required
by article 6, clause 3 "to support this Constittition." 1 45 Of

The function of the article III case-or-controversy limitations, including
the standing requirement, is, however, precisely to ensure that clains of
unconstitutional action will go unreviewed by a court when review would
undermine our system of separated powers and undo the limits the Constitution places on the power of the federal courts.
Barnes, 759 F.2d at 60 (Bork, J., dissenting).
"I Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1168.
141 See Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
1' Id.
'" Id. at 1143 ("Article III requires a chain of causation less ephemeral than a
coin tossed into a wishing well."); see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 762 n.26 (1984)
("We rely on separation of powers prnciples to interpret the 'fairly traceable' component
of the standing requirement.").
"I Indeed, the notion that Congress can be trusted with the final word on the
constitutionality of its procedural rules is not without precedent. Consider the comments
of Professor Black in the judicial impeachment context:
We are used to confiding (or to imagining we confide) all constitutional questions to the courts.
Congress,
rests under the very
heavy responsibility of determining finally some of the weightiest of constitutional questions, as well as a great many important and difficult
questions of procedure. For this purpose, and in this context, we have to
divest ourselves of the common misconception that constitutionality is
discussable or determinable only in the courts, and that anything is constitutional which a court cannot or will not overturn. We ought to under-
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course, taken to its logical extreme this argument supports the
clearly untenable view that by virtue of article 6, clause 3, all
statutes should be given the unquestioned presumption of con-

stitutionality
The problem that judicial review of statutes does not present, however, is that of impermissible control by one branch
over the internal procedures of another. 146 The importance of
allowing the legislative branch to craft the procedural framework by which it conducts its business without intrusion from
the other branches of government is not difficult to understand.
If article I, section 5, clause 2 had granted to the executive or
the judiciary the authority to impose procedural rules on Congress, it would have created not a check on power but rather
a control of one branch by another A similar spectre is presented by allowing an assertion of power by the judiciary,
limited only by self-restraint, to impose its interpretation of
those rules on Congress. 147
The ability of Congress to interpret the Constitution has
been the focus of recent scholarly debate.' 48 The case for rec-

stand, as most senators and congressmen understand, that Congress's
responsibility to preserve the forms and the precepts of the Constitution is
greater, rather than less, when the judicial forum is unavailable, as it
sometimes must be.
C. BLAcK, I.EAcm
inrT: A HAnaoox 23-24 (1974); see Comm. on Fed. Legislation,
The Law of PresidentialImpeachment, 29 REc. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 154, 170 (1974) ("[W]e
believe it would be unconstitutional for the courts to review judgments of impeachment,
even if Congress sought to escape its 'sole' responsibility by enacting a statute conferring
such jurisdiction on the courts. Our conclusion applies equally to judicial review of the
procedures utilized by Congress m impeachment proceedings.") (footnotes omitted).
146 See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 44 (Bork, J., dissenting) ("Every time a court expands
the definition of standing, the definition of the interests it is willing to protect through
adjudication, the area of judicial dominance grows and the area of democratic rule
contracts."), rev'g Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F Supp. 163 (1984), vacated as moot sub
nom. Burke v. Barnes, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986).
147 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
143 Speaking from the perspective of a former member of Congress as well as a
current member of the federal bench, D.C. Circuit Judge Abner J. Mikva has argued
that "at best, Congress does an uneven job of considermg the constitutionality of the
statutes it adopts." Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. Ray. 587, 587 (1983). Judge Mikva suggests that as an institution
Congress is incapable of making the hard constitutional choices. Id. at 608.
In direct response to Judge Mikva, congressional scholar Louis Fisher argues that
"Congress can perform an essential, broad, and ongoing role in shaping the meaing
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ognizing congressional competence to make final constitutional
determinations about its rules is particularly compelling.49, As
Judge Bork noted, asserting judicial power to review procedural
rules raises "the very real problem of a lack of judicial competence to arrange complex, organic, political processes within
a legislature so that they work better." 15 0 Congress is in a much
better position to gather the information necessary to make
prudent determinations about the effect of adopting one appli-

of the Constitution." Fisher, ConstitutionalInterpretationby Members of Congress, 63
N.C.L. REv 707, 708 (1985). He supports this contention by observing that "Congress,
by the very nature of our political system, shares with the executive and the judiciary
the duty of constitutional interpretation." Id. Fisher further contends that "[t]he oath
of office, the finding of facts for constitutional law, the resolution of 'political questions,' and the congressional staff reforms of recent decades are some examples that
reinforce both congressional authority and competence," in the area of constitutional
interpretation. Id.
119No one doubts that Congress, like the Court, can reach unconstitutional
results. As Justice Brennan said in 1983: "Legislators, influenced by the
passions and exigencies of the moment, the pressure of constituents and
colleagues, and the pressure of business, do not always pass sober consti" Yet if we
tutional judgment on every piece of legislation they enact.
count the times that Congress has been "wrong" about the Constitution
and compare those lapses with the occasions when the Court has been
"wrong" by its own later admissions, the results make a compelling case
for legislative confidence and judicial modesty. In a recent evaluation,
George Anastaplo said that "in the great crisis over the past two hundred
years, when Congress and the Supreme Court have differed on major
issues, Congress has been correct."
Justice Brandeis once remarked that "the process of trial and error,
so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial
function." The judiciary's record of the past two centuries supports his
perception: it is a process of tnal and error. At times the Court will admit
its errors of constitutional interpretation and reverse a previous decision.
Some members of the Court have the intellectual integrity to adopt Justice
Jackson's attitude: "I see no reason why I should be consciously wrong
today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday." Others, under the
spell of stare decisis, will stick doggedly to errors of the past. It is
particularly at such times that Congress, the President, and the public have
a duty to exercise independent judgment and prevail upon the Court to
revisit and rethink anachronous holdings. Often constitutional adjustments
can be accomplished without recourse to litigation, either through statutory
change or executive-legislative accommodations.
Fisher, Judicial Supremacy or Coordinate Construction? 43-44 (article based on the
author's paper Does the Supreme Court Have the Last Word in ConstitutionalLaw?
(presented October 17-19, 1986, at the Umversity of Dallas)).
I" Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1182 (Bork, J., concurring).
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cation or interpretation of a procedural rule over another.'-"
A limited scope of judicial review allows a more fundamental protection to work in these cases as well-a protection which
recognizes the dilemma inherent in a constitutional democracy:
judicial review- allows unelected judges to thwart the will of the

majority

152

Justice Scalia has noted that "[tihe degree to which

the courts become converted into political forums depends not
merely upon what issues they are permitted to address, but also

upon when and at whose instance they are permitted to address
them."'5 Thus, if the doctrine of standing is understood to
include a separation of powers element, according to Justice
Scalia, it "restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role
of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of
the majority, and excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should
function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself "1154

'-' See Fisher, JudicialMisjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative Veto Case, PuB. Anaum. R-v. 705, 710 (Nov. 1985) ("Through its misreading of
history, congressional procedures, and executive-legislative relations, the Supreme Court
has commanded the political branches to follow a lawmaking process that is impracticable
and unworkable.").
"I When a court invalidates an act of the political branches on constitutional
grounds, however, it is overruling their judgment, and normally doing so
in a way that is not subject to "correction" by the ordinary lawmaking
process. Thus, the central function and it is at the same time the central
problem, of judicial review: a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is telling the people's elected
representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like.
J. ELY, DEMOCRACy AND DisTausr: A TnnoRy oF JurncAL Ravmw 5 (1980).
U' See supra Scalia, note 139, at 891 (emphasis in original).
'- Id. at 894 (emphasis in original).
Even if the doctrine of standing was once meant to restrict judges "solely,
to decide on the rights of individuals," what is wrong with having them
protect the rights of the majority as well? They've done so well at the one,
why not promote them to the other?. The answer is that there is no reason
to believe they will be any good at it. In fact, they have in a way been
specifically designed to be bad at it-selected from the anstrocracy of the
highly educated, instructed to be governed by a body of knowledge that
values abstract principle above concrete result, and (just m case any connection with the man in the street might subsist) removed from all accountability to the electorate. That is just perfect for a body that is supposed
to protect the individual against the people; it is just terrible (unless you
are a monarchist) for a group that is supposed to decide what is good for
the people.
It may well be,. of course, that the judges know what is
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The democratic process, therefore, must be allowed to work.'-CONCLUSION

Professor Berle has suggested that once the Supreme Court
has expanded its judicial power no room to retreat exists:

"Power cast aside without provision for its further exercise
almost invariably destroys the abdicating power holder-as, for
example, Shakespeare's King Lear found out when he improv' 56
idently abandoned his power, and was promptly crushed.'
It is far too dramatic to conclude, however, that judicial recognition of less power to review congressional rules of proce-

dure results in an impermissable void or an abdication that
57
damages the court.
Indeed, correctly determimng where the judicial review
boundary ends simultaneously plots the line that marks the

power of the legislative branch.158 )While the surveyor's tools
must be carefully chosen, we should not hesitate to adjust the
boundaries when required.
The doctrine of standing, then, necessarily informed by
separation of powers considerations, should serve as the surv-

good for the people better than the people themselves; or that democracy
simply does not permit the genuine desires of the people to be given effect;
but those are not the prermses under which our system operates.
Id. at 896-97 (emphasis in original).
"I Critics might suggest that this view is untenable since it could thwart the review
of an unquestionably unconstitutional rule. Theoretically, for example, a majority of
House or Senate members could approve a rule which applies racial criteria to the
selection of congressional officers. In response to similar criticism, however, Professor
Ely has refused to accept the necessity of playing the "what if" game with regard to
what can only be characterized as highly unlikely hypotheticals: "lilt can only deform
our constitutional jurisprudence to tailor it to laws that couldn't be enacted, since
constitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where representative government cannot be trusted, not those where we know it can." J. ELY, supra note 152, at
183.
", A. BERLE, TmEE FACES OF POWER 51-(1967), quoted in Kurland, Toward a
PoliticalSupreme Court, 37 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 19, 20 (1969).
'51 Although offered in a different context, perhaps the words of Edmund Burke
more closely commuicate the spirit of the problem: "Those who have been once
intoxicated with power, and have derived any kind of emolument from it, even though
but for one year, can never willingly abandon it." Letter to a Member of the National
Assembly (1791), quoted in Tan OxroiD DicnoNARY OF QuOTATIONS 111 (1979).
"' See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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1 59
eyor's transit in the field of congressional rules of procedure.

This analysis would result in the judiciary being denied em-

phatically the power to review, for either constitutionality' 6° or
compliance,' 61 rules which affect purely internal functions of
the Congress. 162 Even when congressional procedural rules reach
out and directly affect third parties who are admittedly injured, 163 the court would be largely without power to review '6
While the weight of authority rejects this jurisdictional re6 has begun the process of redrawing
straint, Kurtz v Baker1
the lines-a process the importance of which Judge Bork has

long recognized: "Major alterations in the constitutional system
can be accomplished through what seem to be minor adjustments in technical doctrine."'

66

In the end, therefore, this

,S,
See supra notes 98, 138-39 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text. The conclusion by Congress,
therefore, that the constitutional quorum requirement can be satisfied by counting
nonvoting members of the House who are present in the chamber is a nonjusticiable
issue. Recognition of the claimed injury, being adversely affected by legislation passed
in an allegedly unconstitutional procedural manner, would unduly enhance the role of
the judiciary. Thus, the first prong of the standing analysis is not met. Neither is the
injury "fairly traceable" to the assertely unlawful conduct when considered with
reference to separation of powers pnnciples. See supra notes 98, 138-39 and accompanying text.
MIFor example, House rules require a separate vote on Senate amendments to
general appropriations bills that, if originating m the House, would have been in violation
of House rules. See HousE RUtLs AND MANUAL, supra note 14, at 570. Although the
House regularly ignores tis rule, its failure to comply is clearly not justiciable. Once
again the separation of powers doctrine given voice in standing methodology requires
this result. Cf. supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
"' Thus, a majority vote of the House that results in the allocation of disproportionate committee assignments to the political parties is not reviewable by the courts.
As already noted the injury resulting is not justiciably cognizable. See supra notes 92108 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 51-81, 117-24 and accompanying text.
,6,
When third parties allege injuries in their own right, the standing analysis does
not per se result in the absence of jurisdiction. Particularly in the case of a witness
before a congressional investigatory committee, a threshold recognition of standing may
not invoke separation of powers concerns. As already argued, if a concrete injury is
alleged and causation established, the court must still consider the potential for encroachment into the rightful territory of the other branches. This concern is conceivably,
although not necessarily, less m the investigatory context. See supra notes 138-39 and
accompanying text.
"I Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
,6 Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
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"question of power" must be answered in favor of the legislative branch.
Gregory Frederick Van Tatenhove**
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